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A MODEST PROPOSAL TO SAVE THE DOUBLE
JEOPARDY CLAUSE*
GEORGE C. THOMAS m**
Though it did not attract much attention, one of Justice Brennan's last
majority opinions for the Supreme Court effected a major change in the
long-standing interpretation of the double jeopardy clause. Brennan's
opinion in Grady v. CorbinI affirmed a position I had taken in previous
articles,2 namely that the double jeopardy clause provides some form of
protection against reprosecution of the same conduct. I still believe the
principle correct. But I also believe the lack of articulated limitations on
the principle renders the 5-4 decision in Corbin unstable because, if un-
checked, it will lead to results that are contrary to our shared intuitions
about what double jeopardy should forbid. Thus, while I would not
phrase it quite the same way, I agree in essence with Justice Scalia's pre-
* I confess. The title is a bit overdramatic. This paper addresses my concerns over the
Supreme Court's new definition of when two different statutory offenses are the "same offense" for
purposes of the double jeopardy clause. See Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990). But even if my
worst fears about the "same offense" definition come true and a future Court interprets the concept
in line with Justice Scalia's dissent, see id. at 2096-2105, that would not mean the end of double
jeopardy protection. It would mean, instead, narrow rather than generous protection. So perhaps
the title should be "A Modest Proposal to Save a Generous Interpretation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause" or "A Modest Proposal to Save the Interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause That I
Happen to Favor." But neither of those titles sounded very catchy to me, and I went with the one
that sounded like a combination of Johnathan Swift and Chicken Little.
** Associate Professor, Rutgers School of Law-Newark. B.S. 1968, University of Tennessee;
M.F.A. 1972, J.D., 1975, University of Iowa; LL.M., 1984, J.S.D., 1986, Washington University.
I am grateful to the S.I. Newhouse Faculty Research Fund of the Rutgers Law School for its
ongoing assistance. I wish to thank Barry Pollack, Howard Baum, Kathleen Brickey, and Judge
Harold Satz for helping me think about the issues in this Article. But my greatest debt is to Frank
Miller, both for his comments on this Article and for his assistance on numerous other projects. I
am especially pleased to be included in the Symposium Issue honoring him. Frank was my thesis
advisor between 1982 and 1986 while I was a J.S.D. candidate at Washington University. Perhaps
his most important contribution to my career was to convince me that double jeopardy was an area
of the law that deserved attention. But, beyond that, he is a relentless editor, a stimulating compan-
ion, and a brilliant teacher. I count myself fortunate to have been able to work closely with him.
1. 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
2. See Thomas, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 827 [hereinafter
Thomas, Elegant Theory]; Thomas, The Prohibition of Successive Prosecutions for the Same Offense:
In Search of a Definition, 71 IowA L. REv. 323 (1986) [hereinafter Thomas, Successive Prosecu-
tions]; Thomas, RICO Prosecutions and the Double Jeopardy/Multiple Punishment Problem, 78 Nw.
U.L. REv. 1359 (1984).
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diction of the societal response to Corbin: "rejection of today's [majority]
opinion is adequately supported by the modest desire to protect our crim-
inal legal system from ridicule."3 Moreover, I agree with Scalia's predic-
tion of Corbin's future if it remains in its current form: "A limitation that
is so unsupported in reason and so absurd in application is unlikely to
survive."4
But if a future Court reverses Corbin on the grounds that Scalia sug-
gests, the result will be to narrow severely the protection of the clause.
Thus, I wish to discuss how Corbin is simultaneously right and wrong.
Then I will propose a solution to this dilemma, one that avoids Scalia's
narrow dissenting position and derives from the literal language of the
double jeopardy clause.
I. THE RIGHT PRINCIPLE
The double jeopardy clause provides, "[NMor shall any person be sub-
ject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." 5
One of the puzzling aspects of the protection is deciding when violations
of different statutes are nevertheless the "same offense."' 6 This issue has
two procedural dimensions-multiple verdicts sought in successive pros-
ecutions and multiple convictions sought in a single trial. The only di-
mension that concerns me in this Article, however, is the successive
prosecution issue: how many trials can the state require a defendant to
face for particular conduct in which he has engaged?
I have previously written about this question and will only sketch the
3. See 110 S. Ct. at 2104 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Kennedy, J.).
Justice O'Connor dissented separately, making essentially the same point and noting that she
"agree[d] with much of what Justice Scalia says." Id. at 2095.
4. Id. at 2104 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. This question is puzzling, of course, only if the term "same offense" does not literally mean
"same statutory offense." There are several reasons to reject a literal "same statute" reading of
"same offense." See Thomas, Elegant Theory, supra note 2, at 847; Thomas, Successive Prosecutions,
supra note 2, at 330-31. Not a single Justice of the Supreme Court has ever argued for this reading.
Even the dissent in Grady v. Corbin, written by Justice Scalia and adopting a strict construction
approach to the double jeopardy clause, fails to mention this argument. The Court has implicitly
rejected the literal interpretation in several cases. See, eg., In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889) (hold-
ing adultery and cohabitation the same offense for purposes of successive prosecutions). The Court
finally rejected it explicitly in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164 (1977).
7. See, e.g., Thomas, Successive Prosecutions, supra note 2; Thomas, A Unified Theory of Mul-
tiple Punishment, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Thomas, Unified Theory]; Thomas,
Multiple Punishments for the Same Offense: The Analysis After Missouri v. Hunter, 62 WASH.
U.L.Q. 79 (1984) [hereinafter Thomas, Hunter Analysis].
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arguments here.' I reached the conclusion that meaningful protection
against successive prosecutions requires a test that draws some equiva-
lence between "same conduct" and "same offense." Two principal argu-
ments support this conclusion. First, our modem world has witnessed an
"extraordinary proliferation of overlapping and related statutory of-
fenses."9 Any test that focuses on offense definitions to the exclusion of
the defendant's conduct renders the protection close to a nullity when a
prosecutor seeks to bring an additional prosecution, to increase the pen-
alty imposed, or to avoid the effect of an acquittal.10 Second, the "same
conduct" reading is not foreclosed by the framers' choice of the term
"same offense." The framers gave no indication that they were "distin-
guishing between the legal theory of an offense and the underlying fac-
tual transaction."11 That is, the conduct of robbery was coextensive with
the offense of robbery, and multiple degrees of robbery or overlapping
offenses such as the use of a firearm to commit12 a felony did not exist in
1792.
I think the point is best made by a hypothetical. X is driving late at
night when her car swerves across the center line and kills a child on the
other side of the road. The state charges X with three minor traffic of-
fenses, none of which permits incarceration: failure to slow to avoid an
accident, speeding, and failure to keep to the right of the median. The
state also charges the misdemeanor traffic offense of drunk driving and
the felony offense of vehicular homicide. Ignoring, for the moment, the
felony offense, it is possible that the minor traffic offenses could be used
to prove X's conduct of drunk driving. But the traditional, pre-Corbin
test for measuring "same offense" would likely dictate that all of these
offenses are different.
The traditional test, often called the Blockburger test,13 deems offenses
to be the same only when proof of one always proves another-for exam-
ple, proof of armed robbery would always prove robbery. While state
8. See supra notes 2, 7.
9. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 n.10 (1970).
10. See Thomas, Elegant Theory, supra note 2, at 834-36 (discussing an example of this kind of
prosecutorial action).
11. Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Moribund
Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 342 (1956).
12. See, e-g., Thomas, Hunter Analysis, supra note 7.
13. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). For a discussion of the Block-
burger test and some of its variants, see Thomas, Unified Theory, supra note 7, at 25-52.
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law determines the result, 4 it seems very unlikely that proving any of the
three minor traffic offenses would always prove any of the others. For
example, proving failure to slow to avoid an accident might prove speed-
ing, but one can easily imagine a situation in which the driver was never
guilty of speeding and still failed to slow to avoid an accident. Similarly,
the offense of speeding would not always prove failure to slow to avoid an
accident because no type of reckless driving invariably results in an acci-
dent. Presumably, this reasoning led the Supreme Court to express skep-
ticism that manslaughter by automobile always proves failure to slow to
avoid an accident."5
Moreover, none of the minor traffic offenses is a necessarily-included
offense of drunk driving-that is, proof of drunk driving does not always
entail proof of speeding, failure to slow, or failure to keep to the right of
the median. If none of these offenses is a Blockburger-included offense of
any of the others, Blockburger would permit the state to separately pros-
ecute X for each manifestation of her drunk driving. This would be true
even if the conduct that constituted one of the offenses-say, failure to
slow to avoid an accident-happened to be essential to proving the other
two. Following those separate trials, the state could reprove all of that
conduct in a drunk driving prosecution. Of course, the minor traffic of-
fenses will not take long to prosecute and do not involve the anxiety and
expense of more serious offenses. But it is controversial, I believe, 'to
'allow the state to reprosecute the minor offense conduct to prove a more
serious offense (drunk driving, in this case).
Even more unsettling is the prospect that the state could prosecute the
drunk driving charge, an offense that might permit incarceration of up to
one year, and then prosecute vehicular homicide months or years later.
Again, though, this is the likely result under Blockburger. Vehicular
homicide can typically be proved without proving drunk driving,16 and
proof of drunk driving obviously does not always prove vehicular
homicide.
Finally, it is not true that proving vehicular homicide would always
14. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 163-64 (1977).
15. See Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410,421 (1980) (expressing "doubts about the [Blockburger]
relationship under Illinois law between the crimes of manslaughter and a careless failure to reduce
speed to avoid an accident"). Corbin states that Vitale "held that the second prosecution was not
barred under the traditional Blockburger test," 110 S. Ct. at 2090, but this is an inaccurate charac-
terization of Vitale. See 447 U.S. at 419-21.
16. See, eg., NJ. REv. STAT. § 2C:11-5 (Supp. 1990) (requiring proof of reckless operation of
vehicle).
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prove any of the traffic offenses. 17 Thus, the Blockburger test would per-
mit five separate trials for the one driving event that caused the victim's
death. If the prosecutor were more creative, and malevolent, she could
surely come up with other offenses that would be separate under Block-
burger and thus permit her to stretch out further the series of prosecu-
tions. This typical fact pattern suggests, I believe, that use of the
Blockburger test as the only definition of "same offense" is an excessively
narrow interpretation of a constitutional provision designed, in part at
least, to promote finality. 8 Moreover, the linguistic argument that "of-
fense" does not mean "conduct" seems trivial when one realizes that the
clause came into existence at a time when none of the narrow offenses in
the hypothetical even existed. Instead, I believe the meaning of "same
offense" must somehow entail "same conduct" when successive prosecu-
tions are the issue.19
"Same offense" can be read in at least three slightly different ways to
prohibit successive prosecutions for the "same conduct," but the consti-
tutional focus will now be on the method the Court used in Corbin.2 °
Corbin, like X, was involved in a traffic accident that resulted in a death
and was initially charged with two of the same traffic offenses as X-
drunk driving and failing to keep to the right of the median. One assis-
tant district attorney was informed of the death,21 but, through a series of
misadventures that would have made the Marx Brothers proud, the state
managed to proceed to verdict and sentencing on the traffic offenses with-
17. See Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2090.
18. See, eg., Thomas, Elegant Theory, supra note 2, at 829-50.
19. That is not the proper interpretation, however, when multiple convictions are sought in a
single trial because the only issue in that context is whether the legislature intended multiple punish-
ment, and Blockburger will suffice, in most cases, to answer this question. See, eg., Thomas, Hunter
Analysis, supra note 7, at 112-14; Thomas, Unified Theory, supra note 7, at 56-61.
20. Two other readings are Justice Brennan's "same transaction" test and an evidence-bar test
suggested by a commentator. Brennan's test requires "the prosecution, except in [the] most limited
circumstances, to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single
criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring). For a comparison of the "same transaction" test to the "same conduct"
test, see Thomas, Successive Prosecutions, supra note 2, at 377-80. The evidence-bar test forbids use
of evidence in one trial that has been introduced in a prior criminal trial that resulted in a verdict.
See Note, The Double Jeopardy Clause as a Bar to Reintroducing Evidence, 89 YALE L.J. 962, 976-
81 (1980). While the evidence-bar test is related to Corbin's "same conduct" test, it is importantly
different. See Thomas, Successive Prosecutions, supra note 2, at 380-82. The Supreme Court has
recently rejected the evidence-bar test. See Dowling v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990) (holding
that evidence of an eyewitness concerning the robber's identity could be introduced in a trial follow-
ing acquittal for an unrelated robbery in which the same evidence was introduced).
21. See 110 S. Ct. at 2088.
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out the relevant members of the DA's office being aware of the fatality.22
Indeed, the assistant district attorney who represented the state at sen-
tencing on the traffic convictions recommended a "minimum sentence"
even though she could not find the case fie, she had not been involved in
the case prior to sentencing, and she had not spoken to the prosecutor
responsible for the traffic prosecution.23
The Supreme Court held that the traffic convictions barred a subse-
quent trial for three other offenses: reckless manslaughter, criminally
negligent homicide, and third-degree reckless assault.24 As the Court ex-
plicitly recognized, Blockburger would not bar a second trial on any of
these counts because none of them would inevitably prove either drunk
driving or failure to keep to the right of the median.2" But the Court
held Blockburger was only the first step in the double jeopardy analysis
of a second prosecution.26 The second step is whether the pending prose-
cution would prove the same conduct that constituted the traffic of-
fenses. 27 Because the state conceded this issue, the Court held that the
double jeopardy clause barred a prosecution for the assault and homicide
offenses.2 8
The legal effect of Corbin is that the state cannot use the facts that
proved a previously-prosecuted offense to prove another offense. As the
Court had stated in dictum ten years earlier, if a defendant "has already
22. The assistant district attorney responsible for gathering'evidence for a homicide prosecution
failed to ascertain when Corbin would appear on the traffic charges and failed to inform either the
traffic court or the assistant district attorney responsible for traffic prosecutions about the fatality.
Thus, the traffic judge had no knowledge of the fatality when the state filed its statement of readiness
for trial. Moreover, no member of the DA's office appeared for the state on the date Corbin pleaded
guilty. The judge accepted the guilty plea but postponed the sentencing because the DA's office had
not submitted a sentencing recommendation. By the date of the sentencing hearing, a full six weeks
after the victim's death, the assistant district attorney who appeared for the state still had no knowl-
edge of the fatality. Moreover, she was even unfamiliar with the traffic offenses. Id. at 208 8-89.
23. Id. at 2089.
24. The state filed two other counts-second-degree vehicular manslaughter and felony drunk
driving-but the state court barred prosecution of these counts on the grounds of Blockburger and
the state statutory double jeopardy provision, respectively. Id. at 2089. The state did not appeal
these questions, id. at 2094 n.13, and, in any event, the United States Supreme Court would have no
jurisdiction to review the state statutory issue.
25. Id. at 2093.
26. Id. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1980), had hinted that successive prosecution
analysis requires two steps when Blockburger permits a second trial. See Thomas, Successive Prose-
cutions, supra note 2, at 350-54, 382-88.
27. 110 S. Ct. at 2093. See also Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980); Thomas, Successive
Prosecutions, supra note 2.
28. 110 S. Ct. at 2094.
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been convicted for conduct that is a necessary element of the more seri-
ous crime for which he has been charged, his claim of double jeopardy
would be substantial."2 9 The effect of Corbin, I believe, is to transform
that language from dictum to a holding, to broaden it to include acquit-
tals,30 and to acknowledge that a "substantial" double jeopardy claim
under this analysis is a dispositive claim."1
Returning to the hypothetical, proof of drunk driving could establish a
necessary element of vehicular homicide. If the state first prosecutes the
drunk driving, Corbin bars a later prosecution for vehicular homicide
that is based on the drunk driving conduct. But the state can avoid
Corbin by prosecuting X for vehicular homicide based on different con-
duct-for example, speeding.32 And it should be fairly easy for the state
to separately prosecute speeding and failure to remain to the right of the
median because neither offense would likely prove conduct that consti-
tutes the other offense.33
While this aspect of Corbin is relatively straightforward, the Court's
phrasing of the test creates the possibility that it is less than a "same
conduct" test.3" The Court expressed its holding as follows: "the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars any subsequent prosecution... [if] ... to
establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution,
the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which
the defendant has already been prosecuted."35 Strictly construed, a pro-
hibition of proving "conduct that constitutes an offense for which the
defendant has already been prosecuted" would seem to permit the state
29. Vitale, 447 U.S. at 420. The New York Court of Appeals characterized this as "pointed
dictum" when it reversed Corbin's convictions for the offenses that would not be barred under
Blockburger. In re Corbin v. Hillery, 74 N.Y.2d 279, 290, 543 N.E.2d 714, 719-20 (1989).
30. The Court stated in Corbin that the double jeopardy clause bars a second trial if "the gov-
ernment will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been
prosecuted." 110 S. Ct. at 2093 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 2087 ("Today we adopt the suggestion set forth in Vitale."). See also Vitale, 447 U.S.
at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. See Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2094.
33. If the state prosecutes speeding first, it can prosecute failure to remain to the right of the
median unless it must rely on the conduct of speeding-which seems unlikely. Similarly, if the state
prosecutes failure to remain to the right of the median first, it can prosecute speeding unless it must
prove X's conduct in crossing the centerline-somewhat more likely but not inevitable. The state
could also separately prosecute failure to slow to avoid an accident and speeding if X's conduct of
speeding was independent of that offered to prove failure to slow.
34. I am indebted to Barry Pollack, one of my students, for helping me clarify this aspect of
Corbin.
35. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2093.
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to reuse the same conduct as long as it did not establish the offense the
prosecutor charged in the first trial. This would often make the order of
prosecution a critical factor; when the state seeks to reprove the same
conduct, lesser offenses could be reprosecuted after greater ones-be-
cause the defendant has never been charged with the lesser-but not
greater after lesser.
For example, we know from Corbin that the state cannot prosecute
drunk driving and then vehicular homicide that is based on the offense of
drunk driving. But what if the order of prosecution is reversed? Under a
strict reading of Corbin, it might be that the state can prosecute vehicular
homicide based on drunk driving and then drunk driving because X has
never been prosecuted for the offense of drunk driving (as opposed to the
conduct of drunk driving).
Even if correct, this narrow reading of Corbin will probably not have a
significant practical effect. Few prosecutors will wish to prosecute a
lesser offense after securing a conviction on a more serious offense based
on the same conduct, and the Blockburger test provides some protection
in the rare cases where it might occur. If X is convicted of drunk driv-
ing, she could not later be prosecuted for being drunk in a vehicle be-
cause proving the former would always prove the latter. And, although
it is perhaps less clear, a prosecution for drunk driving would also seem
to be a Blockburger bar to reckless driving defined as "the reckless opera-
tion of a vehicle." Every episode of drunk driving would, I think, prove
reckless operation of a vehicle.
To be sure, prosecutors may seek with some frequency a minor offense
prosecution after an acquittal on a serious offense, but the principle of
collateral estoppel already provides at least a modicum of protection in
this situation. 6 Assume vehicular homicide requires proof that X oper-
ated a vehicle recklessly. 7 If X's defense in a vehicular homicide prose-
cution is that her driving was not reckless, an acquittal would likely raise
a collateral estoppel bar to a prosecution for any of the other offenses
because each one presupposes a type of reckless driving, and the acquittal
forecloses redetermination of this fact. If, however, X is acquitted of
drunk driving under a defense that she was not drunk, collateral estoppel
would not provide a bar to any speeding prosecution that proves another
cause of reckless driving.
36. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
37. Sea eg., NJ. REv. STAT. § 2C:11-5 (Supp. 1990).
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This brings us to the theoretical question of whether the narrow read-
ing of Corbin is the best reading. Again, the question is what it means to
forbid proving "conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defend-
ant has already been prosecuted." 3 Does this language mean that con-
duct can be re-used unless it constituted a statutory offense previously
prosecuted? If so, a prosecution for drunk driving could follow a prose-
cution for vehicular homicide based on that same conduct.39 The alter-
native, non-literal reading of this language is that a defendant has been
prosecuted for an offense when she has been prosecuted for the conduct
that constitutes that offense. Thus, a prosecution for vehicular homicide
that proves drunk driving has already subjected the defendant to a (func-
tional) prosecution for the offense of drunk driving. One argument in
favor of this broader, non-literal reading is that the double jeopardy
clause forbids reprosecuting the "same" offense, and what is the "same"
offense in one order of prosecution should be the "same" if the order is
reversed. Indeed, the Court has explicitly reached that conclusion in ap-
plying the Blockburger test.'
Another argument in favor of a broader reading is based on what I will
call the "same culpability" principle. When one considers why it seems
like good policy to prevent the reprosecution of conduct, the best answer
is because conduct is the essence of criminal culpability, and criminal
culpability, once determined, should not be redetermined. This state-
ment of policy is the criminal analog to civil res judicata.' t While the
parallel is not perfect,42 it suffices to explain that a bar against re-
38. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2093.
39. It is clear that a prosecution for a lesser offense cannot follow a prosecution for a greater
offense when the lesser is what the Court calls a "component" offense-one that the state "necessar-
fly" proves to prove the greater. See 110 S. Ct. at 2093 n.l. Thus, if the greater offense requires
proof of all the elements of the lesser-as would be the relationship between felony murder based on
rape and the offense of rape-the double jeopardy clause forbids a subsequent prosecution for the
lesser. See Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (per curiam). But drunk driving would not be
a "component" offense of vehicular homicide because the latter could be proved by reckless acts that
do not constitute drunk driving (or, indeed, any offense). Whether there is any justification to treat
"component" lesser offenses differently from other types of "factualy included" lesser offenses is, of
course, another question. See infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
40. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977) ("sequence" of prosecution "immaterial").
41. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168-69 (1873) (explicitly drawing a parallel
between res judicata and double jeopardy).
42. "Criminal" resjudicata protects a defendant's interest in finality by forbidding a redetermi-
nation of guilt as well as innocence. In civil res judicata, a determination of "guilt" does not bar
adverse consequences in another proceeding; quite the contrary, the finding can be used "offen-
sively" to establish the facts without the necessity of proving them again. See Ex parte Lange, 85
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prosecuting the same conduct makes sense because it bars redetermining
culpability. But culpability does not exist in the abstract. Indeed, one
can say that X did act Y, but one cannot say that X is guilty of offense Y
in the absence of a verdict. A verdict entails both facts and a theory of
culpability. Because facts can give rise to multiple, alternative theories of
culpability, our system of justice requires the prosecutor to identify a
charge that describes the defendant's liability. Thus, one of the prosecu-
tor's tasks is to provide coherence to the disorderly facts and inferences
of an unstructured, random universe by alleging that X did Y which
caused Z, and that Y and Z constitute criminal offense Q. The criminal
charge is nothing more than a theory of culpability.
The factfinder will thus have access to the evidence and the prosecu-
tor's theory of how that evidence creates culpability. If the factfinder
determines that X is guilty of vehicular homicide because her drunk driv-
ing caused the fatal accident, what difference does it make to the culpa-
bility question that the prosecutor did not charge drunk driving? It
seems to me that it should make no difference, that proving the facts and
theory of drunk driving establishes the culpability of drunk driving just
as surely as if the offense had been charged.
If I am right about this, the double jeopardy clause is, in effect, an
embodiment of a policy that holds the prosecutor to the theories of cul-
pability presented in the first trial, whether or not they were charged.
Once prosecuted to verdict, the theories of culpability stand as a barrier
to reproving any of that culpability. Thus, the state has proven the cul-
pability of drunk driving when it proves the conduct of drunk driving to
prove the reckless mens rea required by a vehicular homicide prosecu-
tion. It has proven the facts constituting drunk driving, and its theory of
culpability is that the defendant engaged in drunk driving that caused the
death. I think it difficult to distinguish this means of proving culpability
from that used when the state proves drunk driving in a drunk driving
prosecution.
No inevitable meaning of "offense" exists, despite Justice Scalia's best
efforts to establish one.43 It is possible that the framers meant "culpabil-
ity" when they used the term "offense." To be more accurate, Corbin
does not create a "same conduct" test as much as it does a "same culpa-
bility" test. This suggests that being prosecuted for an "offense" is noth-
U.S. (18 Wall.) at 169. The reasons behind this distinction are complex and outside the scope of this
paper.
43. See Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2097 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ing more than being prosecuted for the culpability proscribed by the
offense and that the broad, non-literal interpretation of Corbin's holding
is the best one.
Moreover, one must question the motives of a prosecutor who seeks to
reprosecute the same conduct in a greater-lesser order. In this situation,
unlike the lesser-greater order, the prosecutor must know of the existence
of the lesser offense. Thus, it would seem that this prosecutor must
either be dissatisfied with the verdict in the first prosecution (acquittal) or
with the quantity of punishment. But I believe basic principles of our
adversary system render both of these motives improper. We do not
want the prosecution to be able to "improve its presentation of proof
with each trial" until a conviction finally results.' And the responsibil-
ity for deciding the appropriate sentence is that of the judge, not the
prosecutor.
There is one final argument in favor of the broader reading of Corbin:
none of the four dissenting Justices adopted the narrow reading. Indeed,
Justice Scalia quoted the "constitutes an offense" language and then
wrote, "This means, presumably, that prosecutors who wish to use facts
sufficient to prove one crime in order to establish guilt of another crime
must bring both prosecutions simultaneously.... ."' If Scalia's reading
of the majority opinion proves correct, then Corbin does, indeed, estab-
lish a "same culpability" test for the same offense that applies regardless
of the order of prosecution.
It is, I believe, relatively uncontroversial to conclude that a prosecu-
tion for failure to keep to the right of the median bars a prosecution for
drunk driving that will relitigate the same conduct. It is somewhat more
controversial to conclude that a prosecution for drunk driving will bar a
prosecution for vehicular homicide. But it is, I believe, quite controver-
sial to conclude that a prosecution for failure to keep to the right of the
median will bar a homicide prosecution. The question, then, is whether
Corbin operates to bar a second trial in each of these cases, and whether
Corbin's double jeopardy rule is in need of a limiting principle.
II. THE NEED TO RESTRAIN THE CORBIN PRINCIPLE
I will focus on the most controversial application of Corbin-that a
prosecution for a minor traffic offense will bar prosecution for homicide if
44. Id. at 2093.
45. Id. at 2103 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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based on the same conduct that constitutes the traffic offense. Although
the traffic offense conduct may be an integral part of proving the reckless-
ness required for the homicide prosecution, the much greater seriousness
of the latter charge makes linking them as the "same offense" seem un-
satisfying. I will refer to this as the "disparity problem."
I think the disparity problem can be solved if I am right that a conduct
definition of "same offense" is in reality a "same culpability" definition.
"Same culpability" entails, I think, some rough equivalence in the seri-
ousness of the culpabilities. The culpability for failure to keep to the
right of the median, while part of reckless homicide based on that con-
duct, is so different from the culpability for homicide that it seems jarring
to say that a homicide prosecution will redetermine the culpability of
failure to keep to the right of the median. To be sure, one cannot insist
on much in the way of culpability equivalence without reintroducing the
problem of a narrow "same offense" definition that would permit many
trials for overlapping offenses based on the same conduct. Thus, premed-
itated murder cannot define a different culpability than reckless homi-
cide. And, as the Court has held, joyriding cannot define a different
culpability than auto theft.'
Nonetheless, it still seems implausible that culpability for failure to
keep to the right of the median is the same in a constitutional sense as
that of homicide. It remains, then, to attempt to give a doctrinal voice to
this intuition. There are three quite different ways to address the dispar-
ity problem. One way, arguably attempted by the Corbin majority, is an
artificial approach to what is, I believe, a serious problem.
As noted in the last Part, the Court's formulation of the test in Corbin
does not identify offenses as the same unless the second trial requires the
use of conduct that constitutes an offense previously prosecuted, a phras-
ing that gives rise to narrow and broad readings. Another implication of
the Court's formulation of the Corbin test, as Justice Scalia correctly
notes in his dissent, is that prosecutors may avoid Corbin's rule by prov-
ing in the second trial only some of the facts constituting the offense that
was first prosecuted.47 In that situation, because the prosecutor is not
proving "conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has
already been prosecuted,"4 the literal holding of Corbin is satisfied. In
the hypothetical, for example, it may be possible for the state to prove the
46. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
47. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2103-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 2093.
[Vol. 69:195
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss1/10
1991] PROPOSAL TO SAVE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
reckless mens rea of vehicular homicide by proving that X was not
watching the road as she came around a curve. While this is relevant to
the offense of failure to keep to the right of the median, it is not sufficient
to prove that offense. Thus, a prosecutor might be able to use the con-
duct that proved a minor offense in a prosecution for a more serious
offense by omitting one element of the minor offense.
But this "whole conduct" solution suffers the worst of both worlds as
it is either too narrow or too broad. If the disparity problem is a serious
one, the "whole conduct" solution is artificially narrow in that it operates
by chance to select the cases when second trials will be permitted. The
"whole conduct" solution is merely another mechanism by which the
prosecutor can craft her proof and will only work in cases in which the
proof can be crafted-for example, it would appear impossible to prove
excessive speed as the reckless act for homicide without also proving
speeding. A solution that generates appropriate results in only a subset
of cases is unsatisfying. On the other hand, the "whole conduct" solu-
tion is artificially broad and undermines the "same culpability" principle.
As Justice Scalia aptly argues, if the Corbin principle has appeal, a de-
fendant is not injured any the less when the prosecutor is fortuitously
able to prove the second offense by use of some (but not all) of the con-
duct that proved the first offense.49 A solution that is, at once, too nar-
row and too broad cannot be a very good one.
Justice Scalia offers a second solution. It does not suffer the artificial-
ity of the "whole conduct" solution but has other problems. Scalia ex-
plicitly rejects the equivalence of "same offense" to "same conduct" in
favor of Blockburger as the only test of same offense. Scalia's solution
would thus permit prosecutors to maintain a series of trials based on
precisely the same conduct.5" Since I think "same offense" meant "same
culpability" in 1792, and should mean the same thing today, I would
49. See id. at 2103 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. My favorite example derives from a commentator's observation that Blockburger would
define nine federal narcotics offenses as separate from each other. See Note, Consecutive Sentences in
Single Prosecutions: Judicial Manipulation of Statutory Penalties, 67 YALE L.J. 916, 928 n.43 (1958).
Because a single sale of narcotics could violate all nine of these offenses, Blockburger would permit
the government to spin out nine separate trials that would (almost) endlessly relitigate the same sale
of narcotics. See Thomas, Elegant Theory, supra note 2, at 847-48. The need to limit this kind of
prosecutorial discretion is what infuses the search for a different definition of "same offense" in the
context of successive prosecutions. Professor Brian Serr once commented to me, "But, of course,
prosecutors would not bring nine prosecutions based on a single sale." While this may be true, I
think it quite likely that prosecutors would routinely bring a second (and perhaps a third) trial based
on the same sale if they were dissatisfied with the earlier verdict or punishment. See id. at 834-36
Washington University Open Scholarship
208 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
prefer Corbin's artificial, unsatisfying solution, because it would at least
retain the benefits of the "same culpability" test in some cases even
though it would permit exceptions in a randomly-selected group of cases.
But there is another solution to the disparity problem, one that retains
the "same culpability" principle and avoids artificiality. Remarkably
enough, although the very language of the double jeopardy clause sug-
gests this solution, neither the Court nor any commentator (myself in-
cluded) has yet to mention it. Indeed, the Court has not discussed since
1873 the part of the clause that requires "jeopardy of life or limb" before
its protection applies.
Thus, an undiscussed dimension of double jeopardy protection is
whether a person who faces a traffic conviction has been placed in jeop-
ardy of life or limb. One would hardly think so, but the issue needs
consideration. Moreover, close cases are bound to occur. What about
drunk driving that permits a one-year jail sentence?
III. THE "LIFE OR LIMB" REQUIREMENT AS A
RESTRAINING PRINCIPLE
A culpability test for "same offense" that does not address the dispar-
ity problem is vulnerable. Indeed, the disparity problem has arisen quite
often in the past decade, 51 and it will likely arise much more frequently
in the wake of Corbin's explicit adoption of a "same culpability" defini-
tion of "same offense." The frequency results from the prevalence of
minor offenses, the inevitable disorder in urban prosecutors' offices,52 and
the natural incentive to seek a culpability determination that is at least
roughly proportionate to what the prosecutor believes is justified on the
facts.
In 1873, the Supreme Court decided in Exparte Lange that "jeopardy
(discussing case in which this happened). In any event, the double jeopardy clause must be informed
by a value other than faith in the discretion of prosecutors.
51. Prior to Corbin, it had arisen at least four times before the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Fu-
gate v. New Mexico, 470 U.S. 904 (1985) (equally divided Court affirming lower court's refusal to
bar homicide prosecution following traffic convictions) (Powell, J., not participating); Thigpen v.
Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 (1984) (holding traffic convictions a due process bar to manslaughter trial; not
reaching double jeopardy question); Illinois v. Zegart, 452 U.S. 948 (1981) (denying certiorari, over
dissent joined by three Justices, in case holding that conviction of crossing the median barred trial
for reckless homicide); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 419-21 (1980) (noting "substantial" claim of
double jeopardy if state follows traffic conviction with homicide prosecution based on same
conduct).
52. See Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2095.
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of life or limb" meant that the defendant faced a threat of any criminal
punishment,53 and the Court has not since explicitly revisited "life or
limb." The double jeopardy landscape looks quite different now than it
did in 1873. The Court has explicitly stated that the clause protects cul-
pability determinations,54 and legislatures in the last century have cre-
ated much new criminal culpability upon which this protection can
operate. A substantial part of the new culpability is in the nature of reg-
ulatory offenses that were unknown in 1873. Thus, I believe the time has
come to re-examine what "life or limb" means, and I will do that in the
context of the disparity problem that Corbin implicitly raises.
It is tempting to seek an historical, literal interpretation of "life or
limb," but there is less there than meets the eye. "Life" is easy enough,
suggesting that capital cases trigger double jeopardy protection, but what
are we to do with "limb"? It cannot be limited to its literal meaning of
amputation or mutilation55 for two reasons. First, a literal reading
would have no meaning today because we would consider loss of limb a
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment.
56
No modern penalties put "limb" in literal jeopardy. To read "limb" lit-
erally, then, would be to read it entirely out of the clause. Second, the
framers in all likelihood did not intend a literal interpretation in 1792.
Death replaced amputation and mutilation as the usual punishment for
felons as early as the thirteenth century. 7 Since the framers sought to
restrict the range of permissible punishments in the eighth amendment, it
seems very unlikely that they would simultaneously signal acceptance, in
53. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168-73 (1873).
54. I believe this merely re-institutes the framers' likely understanding of "same offense," Jus-
tice Scalia's dissent in Corbin notwithstanding. Blackstone and Hale are as consistent with a "same
conduct" definition of "same offense" as with any alternative reading. Blackstone, for example,
noted that a conviction of manslaughter barred a prosecution for murder because "the fact prose-
cuted is the same in both, though the offenses differ in coloring and degree." 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *336; see also M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CRowN, 244-46 (1847) (series of exam-
ples). Indeed, a few years after Ex parte Lange, the Court read "same offense" to mean same con-
duct. See In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889) (holding that a prosecution for cohabitation barred a
subsequent prosecution for adultery); Thomas, Successive Prosecutions, supra note 2, at 342-45 (dis-
cussing this point in more detail). Moreover, while this is a complex point that cannot be fully
developed here, I believe that the plea of former attaint existing in 1792, see W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *336-37, has reappeared in a new form in Corbin after a long period of quiescence.
In sum, I believe Corbin, and not Blockburger, is the true descendant of Blackstone.
55. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 452-53 (1899) (detail-
ing eleventh century English punishments, including loss of ears, nose, upper-lip, hands, and feet).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
57. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArI.AND, supra note 55, at 461.
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the double jeopardy clause, of a type of punishment that had long since
disappeared in England.
Moreover, the earliest use of the term "life or limb" had nothing to do
with double jeopardy. It was used in the Magna Carta to describe trial
by battle,58 a species of criminal trial in the thirteenth century that liter-
ally placed the defendant's life and limb in jeopardy. 9 Since trial by
battle had become, by the eighteenth century, a "long forgotten proce-
dure of the dark ages,"'  the framers were almost certainly using the
term other than in its literal sense when they wrote the double jeopardy
clause. This leaves the likely meaning of "limb" quite unclear.
Whatever "limb" means, being in jeopardy of "life or limb" connotes
being prosecuted for an offense that threatens a penalty of some unspeci-
fied gravity. The Court has previously used, in a different context, the
potential penalty as a measure of the constitutional gravity of an offense.
In extending the sixth amendment right to a jury trial to the states, the
Court drew a distinction between "serious" crimes, which required a jury
trial, and "petty" offenses, which did not.61 To make this determination,
the Court noted that the "penalty authorized by the law of the locality
may be taken 'as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments' of the crime
in question."'62 Based on this criterion, the Court drew the line for "seri-
ous" offenses at potential imprisonment of more than six months.
63
Justice Black questioned the wisdom of drawing the jury-trial line at
"serious" crimes, noting that the Constitution guaranteed a right to trial
by jury "[i]n all criminal prosecutions" and for "all crimes" without
qualification. 64 But the Court rejected this argument on two grounds.
First, the Court noted that the common law history suggested that
"petty" offenses punishable by six months or less had been generally "tri-
58. See W. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 359-367 (2d ed. 1914) (discussing chapter thirty-six
of Magna Carta, which provided for "a writ of inquisition of life or limbs," a writ that permitted the
accused to test the adequacy of a homicide charge before twelve recognitors and thus allow those
who were unjustly accused to avoid trial by battle).
59. See Russell, Trial By Battle and the Appeals of Felony, 1 J. LEGAL HIST. 135 (1980).
60. See W. MCKECHNm, supra note 58, at 366-67 (noting that trial by battle was nonetheless
not officially repealed until 1819).
61. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.. 145 (1968).
62. Id. at 160 (quoting District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937) (internal
citation omitted)).
63. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (plurality).
64. See id. at 74 (Black, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting text of the Constitution at
amendment VI and article III, § 2, cl. 3, respectively) (joined by Douglas, J.).
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able without a jury in the American States since the late 18th century. 65
Second, the Court balanced the disadvantage of not having a jury against
the "benefits that result from speedy and inexpensive non-jury
adjudications."
History might suggest a somewhat analogous line for defining "life or
limb." In Blackstone's day, most felonies were punishable by death.67
Thus, when Blackstone wrote that the "universal maxim of the common
law of England [was] that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his
life more than once for the same offence,"' 68 he was stating a rule that
applied to most felonies but presumably not to misdemeanors.69 Indeed,
both Hale and Coke explicitly limited the double jeopardy pleas to
felonies. 70
Drawing on this evidence, some have suggested that "life or limb" im-
plied a limitation of double jeopardy protection to felonies,7 ' a line
roughly analogous to the six-month line the Court drew in the jury trial
cases. Even if this distinction is historically true, however,72 it would be
of doubtful utility today. Since most felonies in the eighteenth century
were punishable by death, any penalty less than death would seem leni-
65. Id. at 71. See also Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160 ("So-called petty offenses were tried without
juries both in England and in the Colonies and have always been held to be exempt from the other-
wise comprehensive language of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provisions").
66. See Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 73.
67. Writing in the eighteenth century, Blackstone noted the "melancholy truth" that "a multi-
tude of successive independent statutes... no less than a hundred and sixty" were punishable by
death. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 18. See also Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163,
173 (1873).
68. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 335. The omission of "limb" here could imply that
the framers intended to adopt a broader protection than the common law pleas provided.
69. Blackstone did not explicitly limit the common law double jeopardy pleas of former acquit-
tal and former conviction to felonies. Compare id. at 335 (plea of former acquittal good against
"subsequent accusation for the same crime" after "a man is once fairly found not guilty upon any
indictment or other prosecution") (implying rule of general application) with id. at 336 (limiting plea
of former attaint to "the same or any other felony").
70. See E. COKE, THIRD INSITrUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 212-214 (1817); 2 M. HALE,
THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 240 (1847).
71. See BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAW § 990 (5th ed. 1872) (noting that "life or limb" rule "prop-
erly... extends to treason and all felonies, not to misdemeanors" but "practically and wisely, the
courts have applied it to misdemeanors also"); J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 5 (1968).
72. It may have had less validity in the late eighteenth century than in the days of Coke and
Hale. As noted, supra note 69, Blackstone was somewhat ambiguous about whether the common
law pleas were limited to felonies. Moreover, Chitty stated the rule of former acquittal and former
conviction as "no man shall be placed in peril of legal penalties more than once upon the same
accusation." See I J. CHrrry, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 452, 462 (1836).
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ent by comparison. The line between misdemeanor and felony was, at
that time, relatively easy to draw and justify.7 3
By the late nineteenth century, however, the distinction between felo-
nies and misdemeanors had lost most of its significance. 4 Indeed, the
present distinction in many states is that misdemeanor sentences are lim-
ited to less than one year and felonies are offenses punishable by impris-
onment of one year or more.75 It makes little sense to draw a double
jeopardy distinction between classes of crimes separated by a theoretical
gap of only one day's punishment.76 This recognition led the Court in
Ex parte Lange to refuse to limit the application of the clause to felonies;
instead, the Court held that "life or limb" meant risk of a "second
punishment. 77
Even if an historical argument were as persuasive in the "life or limb"
context as it was on the jury trial issue, the second half of the jury trial
rationale collapses when applied to double jeopardy. It is relatively un-
controversial to exempt petty offenses from the right to a jury trial be-
cause the value of a jury trial in an individual case is difficult to
demonstrate. There is no particular reason to believe that a jury is more
likely to reach an accurate result than a judge. To be sure, defendants
might prefer "the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored
but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge."' 78  But the
principal benefit of the right to a jury trial is systemic. It "prevent[s]
oppression by the Government" by refusing "to entrust plenary powers
over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of
73. Indeed, Blackstone noted that "inferior" offenses were often treated as civil wrongs "for
which a satisfaction or remedy is given to the party aggrieved." See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARiES 216. See also id. at 217, 218.
74. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 173 (noting "difficulty of deciding when a statute
under modern systems does or does not describe a felony when it defines and punishes an offence").
75. See R. PERKINS & R. BOyca, CRIMINAL LAW 18-19 (3d ed. 1982). Another way of distin-
guishing felonies from misdemeanors is the place where the sentence must be served; felonies are
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary while misdemeanors authorize incarceration in jail.
See id. Even under this latter system, however, the length of incarceration typically reflects the one-
year dividing line. See id.; W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 30 (2d ed. 1986).
76. Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968) (noting that the task of drawing a line
between "serious" and "petty" offenses for purposes of the right to a jury trial "requires attaching
different consequences to events which, when they lie near the line, actually differ very little"); Bald-
win v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970) (noting that drawing the Duncan distinction is "essential if
not wholly satisfactory") (plurality). These cases are discussed supra notes 61-66 and accompanying
text.
77. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 173.
78. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
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judges."7 9 It prevents judges from favoring the state because they know
that future defendants can choose to avoid their judgment.
The double jeopardy right, on the other hand, belongs entirely to the
individual defendant, rather than partly to the defendant and partly to
the system as a whole. A prohibition of successive prosecutions pro-
motes the finality of a judgment with respect to a particular group of
facts and a particular defendant. While its effect may act as a check on
government oppression, that is not, in my opinion, its rationale.8 0 If the
double jeopardy clause protects determinations of culpability, as I have
argued, it is no less violated just because an offense is fortuitously punish-
able by less than one year. The wrongdoer's culpability for joyriding (a
misdemeanor in most states)"1 seems to be wholly included in her culpa-
bility for auto theft (a felony in most states), 2 and any definition that
distinguishes those culpabilities is unhelpful.
To conclude that the felony-misdemeanor or serious-petty distinction
is unhelpful, however, still leaves a role for history to play. Most likely
the framers meant the term metaphorically rather than literally. Early
English law permitted defendants to purchase emendment (atonement)
for some crimes by pecuniary compensation to the injured party (the bot)
and to the king (the wite). 3 But emendment was not available for a
category of serious crimes.8 4 The rationale underlying this principle was
that "by the gravest, the unemendable, crimes a man 'forfeited life and
member and all that he had.' "85 Although the definition of which
crimes could be emended varied over time, 6 it included only serious of-
fenses. Thus, the "life or limb" concept probably referred to crimes for
which a defendant forfeited "life and member," not in a literal sense, but
in the metaphorical sense that required punishment rather than compen-
sation to the victim. This reading would limit double jeopardy clause
protection to non-emendable or "grave" crimes.
In defining "grave" crimes, one could follow history and draw a dis-
79. Id.
80. See Thomas, Elegant Theory, supra note 2, at 832-34, 869-73.
81. See, e-g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 162 n.1 (1977).
82. See, e-g., id. at 163 n.2.
83. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 55, at 451.
84. Id. at 451-52.
85. See id. at 462 (source of internal quotation said to be "the old law," presumably of the
Anglo-Saxon kings, see id. at 449-59).
86. See id. at 452 (noting that even homicide was emendable at times by payment of money,
horses, or oxen).
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tinction between punishment and other purposes served by proscribing
conduct. This is essentially what Ex parte Lange did when it held that
risk of any second punishment is jeopardy of "life or limb," but the
Court left unanswered what "punishment" meant. In United States v.
Halper,7 the Court recently attempted to answer that question, conclud-
ing that a sanction constitutes punishment when it "serves the goals of
punishment," that is, when the sanction "cannot fairly be said solely to
serve a remedial purpose, but rather can be explained only as also serving
either retributive or deterrent purposes."'88 If this is the right way to read
"life or limb," however, it cannot provide a solution to the disparity
problem because most minor offenses serve deterrent (if not retributive)
purposes. The fine authorized for double parking, for example, hardly
serves a remedial function; its dominant purpose is to deter double
parking.
But I believe this aspect of Halper misconceives what is unique about
crimes when compared to other statutory prohibitions. The question is
not whether a particular law seeks to deter conduct-indeed, tort law
also seeks to deter conduct-but whether the conduct deserves to be pun-
ished. This suggests that emendment followed a line roughly between
blameworthy and non-blameworthy conduct. Indeed, Pollock and
Maitland observed that the line between emendable and unemendable
"fluctuated from time to time" and "from district to district" '89 as one
would expect if it roughly tracked societal notions of blameworthiness.
If this is right, "unemendable" means those offenses that society views as
blameworthy or deserving of punishment. But blameworthiness reflects
a concern with retribution (punishment for the sake of punishment)
rather than deterrence. Deterrence assumes a rational, utilitarian bal-
ance of benefits and harms that has to do with perceived risk and
strength of temptation rather than with blameworthiness.
Thus, I would reject the Halper alternative definition of punishment
(serving retribution or deterrence) in favor of one that makes retribution
the sole criterion. Under this approach, "non-grave" crimes would be
those for which the legislature's principal purpose is compensation or
deterrence rather than retribution. Double parking would not qualify as
a "grave" crime under this definition nor would speeding or failure to
stay to the right of the median. Retribution plays a much smaller role (if
87. 109 S. CL 1892 (1989).
88. Id. at 1902.
89. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 55, at 456.
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any) in these offenses than does deterrence. On the other hand, if retri-
bution is one of the principal legislative purposes-not necessarily the
major one-then I believe the proscribed conduct is blameworthy and
the crime "grave." And, as we shall see," the offense in Halper was one
in which retribution played a major role; thus, my revision of the Halper
definition is inconsistent with the Court's dicta but not its holding.
Making a determination on a case-by-case basis of whether retribution
was one of the legislature's principal purposes is fraught with uncer-
tainty.9 1 What is needed is a mechanical line that would guide trial
judges in deciding when double jeopardy protection exists, much like the
Court provided for the jury trial right when it drew a line at six months
authorized incarceration. Fortunately, a similar line is available for the
blameworthiness inquiry; since the focus here is on punishment, rather
than on "serious" versus "petty," I think the legislative judgment to per-
mit incarceration for particular conduct is a rough and ready guide to
what society considers blameworthy conduct.
If no incarceration is authorized it would seem that the principal legis-
lative purpose is compensation or deterrence rather than punishment.
This makes "non-grave" offenses roughly analogous to "regulatory of-
fenses," 92 known in the colorless language of the Model Penal Code as
"violations." 93 They include municipal ordinances and traffic offenses.
The Model Penal Code tracks my blameworthiness analysis in comment-
ing that regulatory offenses do not imply "the type of moral condemna-
tion that is and ought to be implicit when a sentence of imprisonment
may be imposed."'94 While "regulatory offense" is not self-defining, the
Model Penal Code limits the category to those explicitly denominated as
such by the criminal code or those that authorize sanctions short of
incarceration."
I propose, then, that the existence of authorized incarceration serves,
90. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
91. See Halper, 109 S. Ct. at 1904 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (noting that an inquiry into the
"subjective purposes that may be thought to lie behind a given judicial proceeding... would be
amorphous and speculative, and would mire the courts in the quagmire of differentiating among the
multiple purposes that underlie every proceeding, whether it be civil or criminal in name").
92. See Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 247, 258 (1952); Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for
the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689, 720 (1930). For a good discussion of this category of
offenses, see R. PERKINS & R. BoycE, supra note 75, at 880-907.
93. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(5).
94. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
95. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(5).
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in every case, to manifest legislative concern with retribution and thus to
demarcate an offense as "grave." If no incarceration is authorized, the
inquiry becomes whether retribution was one of the principal legislative
purposes. If it was, then the offense is "grave" despite the absence of
authorized incarceration. But I think it quite unlikely that a traditional
offense would manifest a serious concern with retribution unless it au-
thorized incarceration. To be sure, this could be true in the non-tradi-
tional case of corporate offenses. Because corporations cannot be
incarcerated, criminal offenses that target them can only provide fines or
probation as sanctions,96 and a sufficiently large authorized fine or
lengthy probation might mark the offense as being blameworthy. More-
over, corporations can also be charged with violations of traditional of-
fenses.97 Here, the inquiry might properly focus on the potential for
incarceration that an individual would face, because the gravity of the
offense is presumably the same whether it is committed by an individual
or a corporation. Outside the area of corporate defendants, it is difficult
to imagine an offense that manifests retribution in the absence of author-
ized incarceration.9"
Thus, once the Halper definition is refocused on retribution as the ap-
propriate measure of blameworthiness, the legislature's authorization of
incarceration serves as a reliable guide to the category of "grave" offenses
that would place a defendant in jeopardy of "life or limb." But the legis-
lature is not the only entity that can place a defendant in jeopardy of "life
or limb." The prosecutor can charge multiple counts of a "non-grave"
offense sufficient to transform it into a "grave" offense. This is what hap-
pened in Halper. The Halper Court held that cumulative fines under a
single civil statute constitute a criminal punishment for purposes of the
double jeopardy clause if the total fine was "so disproportionate to the
damages caused" that it was "not rationally related to the goal of making
the Government whole." 99 But the key here, I believe, is not the lack of
96. See 1 K. BRiCKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY §§ 1.07, 1.08 (Supp. 1989).
97. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 3571(e) (Supp. II 1984) (setting new maximum fine levels for corpora-
tions at $500,000 for felonies and for misdemeanors resulting in death); 1 K. BRICKEY, supra note
96, at § 1.07 (discussing sanctions on corporations contemplated by Sentencing Commission's pre-
liminary report).
98. For example, a few jurisdictions have decriminalized the possession of small amounts of
marijuana. Perhaps this would be considered blameworthy conduct due to its history as an offense
that permitted incarceration. But, on balance, it would seem that the legislative decision to
decriminalize an offense would inevitably reflect a social judgment that it is no longer considered
blameworthy.
99. Halper, 109 S. Ct. at 1903.
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a remedial purpose; it is, instead, that the government's dominant pur-
pose was to achieve retribution. The amount of fraud was $585,1" yet
the government charged 65 counts that required a total sanction of
$130,000.10 Because this seems designed to punish the particular
wrongdoing, Halper's holding that the proceeding was barred by a prior
criminal verdict for the same conduct is consistent with my argument
that retribution is the best marker for "grave" offenses that place a de-
fendant in jeopardy of "life or limb." 10 2
Since I believe that blameworthiness is determined either by the legis-
lature's purpose in enacting the law or by the prosecutor's use of that
law, lack of incarceration in an individual case would not change the
character of a blameworthy offense. Thus, the Court's right to counsel
cases do not provide a solution to the "life or limb" problem. The Court
held, in those cases, that lack of incarceration of a particular indigent
defendant meant that no right to counsel violation had occurred.10 3 But
whether incarceration was imposed in a particular instance has to do
with factors in addition to the blameworthiness of the proscribed con-
duct-for example, the likelihood that the defendant will violate the
criminal law in the future. More importantly, a test that looks to the
sanction actually imposed is inconsistent with the double jeopardy clause
policy that defendants not be forced to endure the second prosecution,
regardless of the penalty imposed."°
In sum, I believe that double jeopardy protection should be limited to
"grave" offenses-those offenses that, in purpose or effect, manifest
100. Id. The Court was willing to consider all the government's costs resulting from the fraud as
the measure of damages, not merely the amount of fraud itself. The district court had approximated
the government's total expenses at $16,000. Id. The government did not seek to prove its expenses,
and the Court remanded the case to give it that opportunity. Id. at 1904.
101. Id. at 1896.
102. Blameworthiness would not usually attend a civil penalty, however, because most civil
sanctions are remedial in effect as well as in purpose. Id. at 1902.
103. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
104. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326 (1970) (stating that "[the 'twice put in jeopardy'
language of the Constitution thus relates to a potential, i.e., the risk that an accused for a second
time will be convicted of the 'same offense' for which he was initially tried"); United States v. Ball,
163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896) (noting that the "prohibition is not against being twice punished, but
against being twice put in jeopardy") (emphasis added). In Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856
(1985), the Court held that a second conviction for the same offense violates the multiple punishment
aspect of double jeopardy even if no penalty whatsoever is imposed. Ball is a federal case, and the
Court premised its reasoning on congressional intent, but I believe its holding derives from the
double jeopardy clause itself. If so, it would be binding on the states as well. See Thomas, Sentenc-
ing Problems Under the Multiple Punishment Doctrine, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1351, 1418-23 (1986).
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blameworthiness. In almost all cases, whether the offense permits incar-
ceration will determine blameworthiness, meaning that most regulatory
offenses will not trigger double jeopardy clause protection. I also believe
that the constitutional text supports this exclusion from double jeopardy
protection. If "life or limb" is 1792 shorthand for "grave" or "unemend-
able" criminal penalties of that era, then minor traffic and other munici-
pal offenses would seem beyond this definition of "life or limb" because
they did not exist at that time. This argument is consistent with Ex parte
Lange's holding that "life or limb" means "criminal punishment" if we
read "crime" in its 1873 context and thus exclude modem regulatory
offenses.
My proposed limitation of double jeopardy protection would not, how-
ever, have led to a different result in Corbin itself. Although the Court
does not indicate the potential penalty of the traffic charges to which
Corbin pleaded guilty (misdemeanor drunk driving and failing to keep to
the right of the median), the New York traffic code authorized incarcera-
tion of up to one year for the drunk driving offense. 105 This offense
would qualify as "serious" for purposes of the right to a jury trial. It
would also qualify as "grave" under my proposed test that looks to the
potential for incarceration for any period of time. This means that
Corbin is right both in its principle and its result.
But, as the Court took great pains to point out, prosecutorial inept-
ness, in large part, caused the result in Corbin °106 There is no reason,
even under a "same culpability" version of double jeopardy protection,
that Corbin could not have been tried in a single trial for reckless man-
slaughter, assault with injury, drunk driving, and failing to keep to the
right of the median.107 It requires only that the person responsible for
prosecuting the traffic offenses note that an accident and death resulted
from the defendant's conduct. At that point, the prosecutor's office
could determine whether it wanted to join all four of the offenses, join
only some of them, or prosecute only the most serious offense. 108 Since
105. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 1192(3), (5) (McKinney 1986).
106. See Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2087-88.
107. See Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2095 ("With adequate preparation and foresight, the State could
have prosecuted Corbin for the offenses charged in the traffic tickets and the subsequent indictment
in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding the double jeopardy question.").
108. Id. at 2095. More than one conviction for the same conduct can be imposed in a single trial
if authorized by the legislature. See, eg., Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983); Thomas, Hunter
Analysis, supra note 7. The Blockburger test is used to determine whether the legislature has author-
ized multiple convictions when there is no explicit guidance on this question. See Thomas, Unified
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the drunk driving offense in New York authorized a punishment of up to
one year in jail, it surely justified that level of attention.
Limiting double jeopardy protection to crimes that proscribe blame-
worthy conduct (usually identified by whether the offense authorizes in-
carceration) has three advantages. First, from a practical standpoint,
offenses that authorize incarceration are sufficiently serious that the pros-
ecutor's office is effectively put on notice of the existence of the charge
and pending prosecution. If the prosecutor proceeds with a prosecution
for a less serious offense, the state can be charged with having made an
election of that culpability rather than a more serious one." 9
Second, the limitation to offenses that authorize incarceration is con-
ceptually consistent with the culpability principle that I believe underlies
Corbin. Equating the culpability of a minor traffic offense to that of
homicide strikes me as a peculiar use of "same culpability." The third
advantage is related to the second but deserves separate mention. Judges
naturally recoil from applying the double jeopardy clause to permit mi-
nor traffic offenses to substitute for serious felonies, and their recourse is
to define "same offense" narrowly to permit a second prosecution. 110
The narrow definition used in these cases damages the fabric of double
jeopardy protection, permitting prosecutors to bring multiple prosecu-
tions for a series of serious offenses that prove the same culpability.1  I In
the 1981 case of Illinois v. Zegart,1 1 2 for example, the state court held
that a traffic conviction barred a homicide prosecution. Three members
of the Supreme Court dissented from the majority's refusal to overturn
the state court decision and argued that only the narrow Blockburger test
should measure the protection against successive prosecutions.1 1 3 Justice
Theory, supra note 7, at 56-58. Because reckless manslaughter would not always prove assault with
injury, drunk driving, or failing to keep to the right of the median, these offenses would not be the
same under Blockburger.
109. See Thomas, Elegant Theory, supra note 2, at 869-73 (describing a theory of culpability
election that works against the prosecutor as well as defendants).
110. See, eg., Fugate v. New Mexico, 470 U.S. 904 (1985) (equally divided Court affirming
lower court's holding that double jeopardy did not bar homicide prosecution following traffic convic-
tions) (Powell, J., not participating); Illinois v. Zegart, 452 U.S. 948, 948 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari) (joined by Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ.).
11. Cf. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 787-89 (1985) (arguing, in dicta, that conviction
for offense of importing marijuana was not "same offense" as greater crime that required proof of
that offense).
112. 452 U.S. 948, 948 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (joined by
Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ.).
113. See id. at 951 (Burger's dissent argues that the double jeopardy clause "require[s] the courts
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Scalia's dissent urged the same standard in Corbin, and three other Jus-
tices joined his opinion. With Justice Brennan retired, the Blockburger
faction could already have the votes to overrule Corbin and institute a
test so narrow that it would permit nine prosecutions for a single sale of
narcotics. 114 But I believe that result is equally as erroneous as permit-
ting a traffic conviction to bar a homicide prosecution. I want a solution
to both excesses, and I think the "life or limb" analysis is precisely that
solution. It is an explicit part of the double jeopardy clause, it derives
from the same notion of culpability that underlies Corbin's "same con-
duct" test, and it is consistent with societal notions of blameworthiness.
Finally, my "life or limb" solution would permit the Court to solve the
disparity problem without overruling Corbin.
IV. CONCLUSION
Society is better served by a meaningful bulwark against reprosecution
when the same "grave" culpability underlies both trials than by an all-
inclusive barrier that causes courts to twist the definition of "same of-
fense" to fit the equities of a particular case. Courts are right when they
seek to fashion an interpretation of the double jeopardy clause that per-
mits the state an opportunity to prosecute "grave" culpability following a
prosecution for a regulatory offense based on the same conduct. But
courts use the wrong tool to achieve this result, in my opinion, when they
rely on the definition of "same offense," because it causes them to re-
verse, distinguish, or ignore earlier decisions that prohibited more than
one prosecution for the same "grave" culpability. The solution is to ex-
plicitly remove "non-grave" offenses from the ambit of the double jeop-
ardy clause, while retaining Corbin's "same culpability" test as a
mechanism to prevent successive prosecutions that seek to relitigate the
same "grave" culpability.
to look to the statutory elements of the first and second charges, not to similarities of facts in the
government's proof") (emphasis in original).
114. See supra note 50. Compare Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (permitting three
convictions, in single proceeding, for single possession of narcotics that violated three offenses each
of which required proof of a distinct element).
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